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Article 7

Securitization of Lodging Real Estate Finance
Abstract

In the early 1990s, the U.S. lodging industry witnessed a severe shortage of debt capital as traditional lenders
exited the market. During this period hotel lending was revolutionized by the emergence of real estate debt
securities. The author discusses key factors which have affected the growth and development of commercial
mortgage backed securities and their changing role as a significant source of debt capital to the lodging
industry.
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Securitization of lodging
real estate finance
by A.J. Singh

In the early 1 9 9 0 ~the
~ U.S. lodging industry partially fill in the credit gap and
witnessed a severe shortage of debt capital take advantage of the depressed
as tradition& lenders exited the market.
estate. In
Durfng this period hotel lending was revolutionizw' bv the emergence of real estate ~articular,new debt instruments
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a significant source of debt capital to the (CMOS) and real estate mortgage
Idging industry.
investment conduits (REMICS)

'commercial

A

n historical review of
financing in the lodging
industry indicates a
cyclical pattern. During certain
periods, capital has been readily
available, while during other
periods the industry has suffered
from a dearth of capital.
In the 1980s, for example,
excess capital availability resulted
in a period of overbuilding,
whereas the early 1990s were
characterized by a financing
drought. During the cyclical downturn and retrenchment of traditional lending sources, alternative
sources of financing emerged to

emerged during this period as new
investment vehicles which revolutionized the way in which cornmercia1 real estate is financed.
Today capital sources for mortgage debt are more than four times
the size of equity markets, and as
of September 2001, non- government CMBS issuance was a t
$247.8 billion, constituting about
15 percent of the $1.676 trillion
debt
market.' Undoubtedly,
CMBS's have become a major
source of capital for commercial
real estate.
Historical approach taken
&ven the importance of debt
securities in financing commercial
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real estate, the study was designed
to comprehensively review and
analyze the evolution of mortgagebacked securities which emerged in
the 1990s to finance the lodging
industry. During each phase of their
evolution, the study will highlight
specific fadors and events which
have shaped the innovative debt
instruments and their market.
Furthermore, the study discusses
the outlook of the CMBS market
and the impact of securitization on
real estate finance.
This is historical research
which relies upon secondary literature, including texts, relevant articles, research studies, and other
significant documents from each of
the periods studied. Commenting
on historical research, Baumgartner states that "using the
historical approach, the researcher
endeavors to record and understand events of the past. In turn,
interpretations of recorded history
hold to provide better understanding of the present and suggest
possible future directions."'

gages ceased because portfolio
lenders viewed illiquid real estate
loans unfavorably. To resolve this
capital crisis, the federal government intervened by setting up
federal government agencies such as
the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMAor Fannie Mae),
Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie
Mac), and Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA or
Ginnie Mae). They began
purchasing mortgages from lenders
such as banks and life insurance
companies, and issued mortgagebackcd securities to investors.
Investors were mainly attracted to
these securities because of the
default guarantees provided by the
government agencies.
The involvement of the federal
government on such as large scale
played a critical role by providing
early momentum which helped
establish the secondary mortgage
market. In the 1970s this direct-sale
program, as it was known, was
Further extended by the creation of
mortgage-backed securities. 'This
was the beginning of one of the most
important developments in real
estate lending that has occurred
since the invention of the mortgage
itself-the securitization of mortgage debt.'"

Topic is not new
The need to create liquidity and
a secondary market in commercial
real estate is not new. Some of the
early initiatives in this area included
the "mortgage backed bonds of the
1920s, the real estate (mortgage)
trusts of the early 1970s, the indus- Commercial securities sold
trial revenue bonds and mortgage
The 1981 Economic Recovery
participations and the syndications Tax Act (ERTA) real estate tax
incentives, declining interest
of the 1980s."
As interest rates skymcketed in rates, and deregulation of the
the late 1970s, capital flow to savings and loan association
commercial and residential mort- created a conducive setting for the
FIU Hospitality Reuiew /Spring2004
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development and sale of commercial securities. As capital flow
increased for commercial real
estate, a few insurance companies,
banks, and savings and loans
started to utilize commercial
mortgage originators, albeit
slowly. The secondary market in
real estate began when lenders in
a particular geographical area
who had more available capital
than demand for it bought mortgages from lenders in geographical areas that had a shortage of
capital. By 1985, the total
issuance of commercial mortgage
securities was $2.7 billion,
growing to $8.3 billion by 1991.
Whiie the size of this capital
market was relatively small in
1980, and growth rate very slow,
significant developments during
this period helped organize this
emerging market for commercial
real estate debt securities. First,
investment banks such as
Salomon Brothers, First Boston,
Morgan Stanley, Drexel, and
others began to take notice of this
market and used their expertise in
the residential secondary market
to design similar issues for
commercial securities. Second, as
banks became involved in the sale
of these securities they created
multiple financial securities (products which they could sell) based
on the riskheturn appetite of the
investors, called "tranches," which
refers to the multiple risk classes
in a commercial real estate loan
pool; this further deepened the
market for debt securities. Third,
the creation of tranches required

the assignment of a risk rating to
each class; as a result, Standard
and Poor's began to assign risk
ratings during this period. Thus
began a period of formal analysis
and evaluation, which provided
investors with information and
transparency about these new
financial products.
Finally, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 ushered in a new era of securitization by creating Real Estate
Mortgage Conduits (REMICS).
This new structure facilitated the
pooling and securitization of mortgages, broadened the appeal of the
mortgage security to a wider
group of investors, and gained
preferred tax treatment for both
issuers and investors.
1990s brings maturity
The Tax Reform Act of 1986
directly contributed to the development of the market for commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS) in another significant
way. The legislation made investment in commercial real estate
less attractive by reversing tax and
other accounting benefits accrued
from previous legislation. Hotel
and other commercial real estate
projects initiated before the
passage of the TRA were conceived
as tax-sheltered vehicles which
now became unprofitable and
resulted in an overbuilt commercial real estate industry by 1989.'
As the industry collapsed
under the burden of highly leveraged real estate assets, lenders
foreclosed on numerous delinquent
loans and were consequently
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saddled with a large portfolio of
non-performing loans. Congress
passed the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act in 1989 (FIRREA),which
chartered the Resolution Trust
Corporation to help liquidate the
savings and loan loans and real
estate owned properties. Investment banks were hired by the RTC
to underwrite and dispose these
non-performing loans. By 1993,
the RTC had disposed of approximately $14 billion in commercial
real estate assets through the
CMBS market.
A variety of factors made the
CMBS product attractive to institutional investors and lenders
during this period. Most traditional lenders facing recent losses
from direct lending to commercial
real estate were more comfortable
with the liquidity of a real estate
security. Furthermore, FIRREA
imposed stricter lending regulations that required them to maintain higher loan loss reserves and
provided traditional lenders, such
as life insurance companies a
reason to shift debt capital to
CMBSs. The impact of these
factors resulted in a dramatic
growth in the issuance of CMBs
from 1990 to 1992 (See Table 1).
The confluence of these factors
resulted in a significant transformation of the secondary market for
securitized debt in the early 1990s;
as a result, by 1993 the total
issuance of CMBSs increased to
$17.5 billion.

72

New period begins
Weak real estate markets and
the RTC's need for an efficient loan
exit strategy drove the CMBS loan
pools in the early 1990s: By 1993,
the original pools of non-performing
loans dried up and issuers needed a
fresh allotment of loan pools to
sustain the emerging market for
CMBSs. Therefore, beginning in
1993, securitization entered a new
period called "conduit lending."
Working with correspondent
mortgage lenders (the conduits),
investment banks purchased mortgages expressly for creating debt
securities for sale in the secondary
market. From 1993-95, loan
conduit lenders and investment
bankers actively solicited and
searched for mortgages and "manufactured" them into securities for
sale in the secondary market. Their
efforts sustained the CMBS
market, which grew by 40 percent,
for the next two years (See Table 1).
Whereas CMBS was a "problem
solving" tool in the early 1990s, it
now became an "opportunity tool.""
The conduit market slowed down in
1995as portfolio lenders such as life
insurance companies returned to
real estate capital markets, making
direct commercial real estate loans,
and competed directly with issuers
of debt securities.
With a growing economy and
low interest rates, there was a
strong interest in real estate investments from 1996 to 1998. This
period also saw strong growth and
maturation of the CMBS market,
with a cumulative growth of 183.5

FIU Hospitality Review /Spring 2004
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Table 1
Total issuance of commercial mortgage backed securities
1984 to 2003 (August 29)
Year

Total Issuance
(Billions)
$0.2
2.7
1.1
0.9
1.2
1.7
4.8
8.2

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

-----

2003 (Aug 29)

53.7

Growth

Percentage

1250%
(59.25)
(18.2)
33.0
42.0
182.3
70.8

,

.

-

Source: Commeclal Moilgage Alelt

percent from 1996 to 1998 (See
Table 1).The CMBS market started
to slow down after reaching a
market ~ e a kin 1998 with a total
issuance of $78 billion. From 1996
to 2000, the lodging industry
witnessed its strongest performance in terms of demand,
revenue, and profitability growth,
and growth through mergerJ and
acouisitions. Conseauentlv, during
the period from 1997 to 1999 the
percentage of hotel loans as a

component of securitized loans also
increased, with a peak in 1998 of 12
p e ~ e n(See
t Table 2).

~

~in2000
~ declines
k
~
t
The new millennium saw a
relatively softer C W S market in
the United States. Total issuance
that year was $61 billion, as
compared to $67 billion in 1999,
with total hotel issuance of $4.7
billion as compared to $6.7 billion in
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Table 2
Issuance of hotel CMBS
1995-2002
Year

Total Hotel
Issuance
(Billions)

Hotel CMBS
Percentage To
Total Issuance

1995

$0.0

00%

1997
1998
1999

2000
2001
2002 (Ql)

.4
9.7
6.7
4.7
5.9
.5

9.4
12.3
9.9
7.7

6.0
3.9

Sourre: Commercial Mongage Alert

the previous year. A lack of properties in need of refinancing combined
with rising interest rates were two
factors which influenced the low
CMBS volume in 2000. Specifically,
as of August 2000, CMBSs backed
with hotel and retail mortgages
waned in popularity? Nevertheless,
in the more recent environment of
2001-02, CMBSs preserved their
status as a mature financing
vehicle and an important source of
debt capital for the commercial real
estate industry.
' h o issues have affected the
current environment of the CMBS
marketplace. First, the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001,
accelerated the already weakening
economy and real estate markets.
Second, while the "event crisis"
generated by the attack affected all
property types, the effect on certain
property types, such as hotels, was
much more catastrophic. These two
74

combined effects of the terrorist
attacks resulted in a reduction of
CMBS issues in 2002. The outlook
in 2003 is more positive, with the
issuance as of the first half of 2003
at $41.22 billion as compared to
$31.74 billion for the same period
last year, an increase of about 30
percent. Commercial mortgage
backed securities spreads also
continued to narrow, a further
reflection of the shortage of new
issues (See Table 3).
Downgrades expected
Most market analysts expect to
see more downgrades versus
upgrades as rating agencies take
stock of the current environment
and as delinquency rates on loans
rise, resulting in loan defaults.
Ninety percent of the participants
responding to a CMBS World
survey expected delinquency rate to
rise. The most pessimistic projecFIU Hospitality Reuiecu /Spring 2004
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Table 3
Commercial mortgage backed securities
trading spreads above isyear treasury bonds (in basis points)
1998-2002
Class
Returns of 10-year
treasurv bonds
CMBS trading spreads

AAA
AA
A

BBB
BBBBB
B
Sourre: Maqan Stanley Dean Winel

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

4.87%
1998
t140
t165
t190
t270
t350
t575
425

6.44%
1999
t124
+I44
t164
t210
t295
t525
400

5.11%
2000
t147
t162
t177
t235
t280
t525
+815

5.05%
2001
t130
t150
t175
t225
t265
t575
tlOOO

3.81
2002
t93
t107
t122
+I83
t224
t450
t950

tions were 5 percent with opti- turn in travel. Interestingly, recent
mistic estimates being 1.22 survey results reveal that CMBS
percent! Compared to 1.6 percent market participants were more
in 2000 and 6 7 percent in 1999, concerned about limited service
this is a monumental increase. hotels versus full-service hotels
Examples of recent downgrades by with regard to loan originations and
rating agencies Moody's and Fitch's inclusion in CMBS loan pools."
default projections outlined in
While the short term forecast
Tables 4 and Table 5 illustrate the for the lodging industry is
current mood of CMBS analysts. pessimistic, industry analysts are
The downgrades in Table 4 were more confident of growth and
loans collateralized by five upscale recovery in 2003. In a recent interHilton hotels, a segment which was view, Jacques Brand, managing
most impacted by the recent down- director with Deutsche Bank,
Table 4
Moody's downgrade of HHPT 2000-HLT
March 14,2002
Class

E

To

From

Notches

Baal

A2

7

Sourre: Moody$, Merrill Lynch
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stated, 'mere is virtually no hotel
supply coming online in the late
2002 and certainly not any in 2003.
Therefore, with virtually no new
supply and with demand historically growing with GDP, the
industry should be poised for
growth in 2003. As the U.S. comes
out of this ewnomic downturn over
the next year, I expect the lodging
sector to fare extremely well."lo
The results of Table 5 indicate
an overall increase in expected
defaults and delinquencies in the
CMBS portfolio. Not surprisingly,
hotels are expected to default at a
higher rate than the wre properties
(4.0 percent versus .60 percent). The
expectation of increasing defaults in
the hotel sedor partly explains the
reason why CMBS originations and
issuances are low this year. In a
recent interview, Arthur Adler of
Jones Lang LaSalle Hotels said that
lenders are having diEculty underwriting the hotel industry based on
the uncertainty in their future
performance as an aftermath of
September 11."
Analysts at rating agencies
such as Moody's and Fitch are being

extremely cautious and conservative in including hotels in the loan
pool and rating hotel mortgages.
Moody's believes that it might take
a year or more for travel patterns
and lodging demand to reach
normalized levels. Additionally, in
their opinion, recovery will not be
uniform but based on the market
segment and l~cation.'~
Conservatism is present
In a similar vein, Fitch plans to
take a very conservative approach
in underwriting hotel assets by
reducing the 12-month trailing
REVPAR by 20 percent. Furthermore, their analysis will inflate
fixed and variable expenses in light
of recent increases in costs. In
particular, the cost for insurance for
commercial properties has risen
since September 11. Hotels in
particular expect these costs to
increase from 15 to 50 percent,
depending on the line of coverage.
Referring to insurance costs, Tony
Rodolakis, vice president of risk
management for Stanvood Hotels &
Resorts, recently stated, "The
biggest increases are on the prop-

Table 5
DefaulVdelinquency rate outlook
2000 vs. 2002
Property
2000 Default
September 2001
T.V. D ~
Rate
Delinouencv
. .Rate
Core'
0.40%
0.80%
Hotels
1.50
2.50
Healthcare
3.50
9.50
*Core properties (office, retail, multi-family and industrial)

2002 Default
Rate

2002
Delinouenw Rate

0.60%
4.0
3.50

1.55%
7.50
13.88

. .

Soum: JP Morgan and Fitch
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erty side. We are in the midst of will affect the future development of
renewing now and anticipate a 50 the secondary market. First, since
percent increase."I4
November 2000, new ERISA
(Employment Retirement Income
Security Act) legislation has
Losses less severe
While CMBS issuances are allowed pension fund managers to
expected to pick up in the second invest in CMBS tranches rated
half of 2002, the outlook for the BBB or higher. With this change,
balance of 2002 is lower than 2001 the eligible securities for investlevels. This is the combined result of ment increased by about 25 percent,
rising delinquency rates, concern which in turn may increase the
over the health of the hotel, health capital flow into the C B S market.
care, and retail sectors, potential for Second, recent analyst research has
increasing interest rates, decline in identified a strong correlation
loan maturities, and the threat of between the movement of CMBS
new terrorist activities. Overall, the spreads and spreads of similar
CMBS issuances and secondary maturity interest swaps. Using this
market volume should remain information, a portfolio manager
healthy throughout the year, could "reduce interest rate risk on
responding to events as they unfold warehoused loans by building
hedge positions as the warehouse
in an orderly manner.''
Key results from CMBS World's portfolio grows, then unwind the
recent survey further strengthen hedge upon issuing the CMBS secuthis expected outlook. Survey rities collateralized by the loans."
Finally, the biggest issue in
participants indicated that losses
today's
market is the lack of buyers
will be less severe than the last
recession, with more than 56 for the lowest CMBS tranches,
percent of the participants believing termed as "B-piece buyers." Since
that the CMBS market will sunive there are very few firms which
the economic downturn and actu- purchase these lowest rated and
ally emerge stronger; another 33 highest risk tranches, they exert a
percent believe that it wiU survive strong influence on the process of
but remain the same. As testimony securitization. They have a strong
to the purported market discipline voice in determining which loans
imposed by the securitization are included in the securitized
process, two thirds of the respon- pools, and can demand the removal
dents indicated that underwriting of loans which they feel are too
on deals would be tougher. with a risky In effect, their actions raise
strong consensus on this question the quality of tranches they
among investment bankers, purchase and increase the overall
investors, originators, and rating quality of the security issue. In the
future, the extent to which the
agencies.'"
Finally, as the CMBS market CMBS issuers are successful in
continues to evolve, three events retaining and attracting more firms

Singh
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to absorb these lower-rated
tranches, the secondary market
will remain flat, grow, or decline."
As the 21st century progresses,
the interrelated events and lessons
learned in the past decades have
restructured capital sources and
redesigned lodging industry
finance in many ways. With the
introduction of new sources of
finance, the lodging industry is no
longer dependent solely on the
traditional lending sources such as
commercial banks and life insurance companies. Securitization
created a new financing vehicle by
introducing a public source of
capital. With the creation of new
and alternate sources of financing
and resultant increase in competition within the capital markets,
borrowers may benefit by a reduction in the cost of capital. While
competition may favorably impact
the cost of capital for borrowers,
they are now faced with more stringent underwriting terms with the
introduction of rating agencies that
critically analyze and rate securities based on the quality of
the mortgage collateral. This,
however, is beneficial to the
industry as a whole by introducing
market discipline, which should
prevent the overbuilding excesses
of the 1980s."
Base is broadened

With the introduction of tradable securities, the investor base for
commercial real estate has broadened. Previously, capital sources for
the industry were restricted to
those who were knowledgeable

about a particular property type,
such as hotels. With the introduction of securities backed by a diversified asset base and rated to suit
the risk tolerance of investors,
knowledge of hotel industry
dynamics is not a prerequisite for
investment.
As real estate and public
markets become more integrated,
capital market factors exogenous to
the property markets have an
impact on the flow of capital to real
estate. For example, the Asian
currency crisis disrupted fmedincome markets and triggered
widening CMBS spreads in the fall
of 1997. None of these events had
anything to do with local property
market dynamics.lg Conversely,
however, positive global market
factors will result in increased
capital flow to real estate.
When hotel borrowers are not
able to meet their payments, they
were previously accustomed to
dealing with their neighborhood
banker who worked with them
based on past relationships.
However, with securitization,
pooling and servicing agreements
transfer the administration of
delinquent loans to special
servicers who then will decide in
favor of a workout or foreclosure,
purely on the merits of the case.
After receiving their early
impetus in the 1970s with the
involvement of the federal government in providing liquidity to the
residential capital markets, the
secondary mortgage markets
continued to grow through the
1980s with the involvement of
FIU Hospitality Review /Spring 2004
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investment banks that engineered
specific investment bonds to suit
the commercial investor. As traditional lending sources reduced
significantly, the CMBS markets
grew rapidly and matured in the
1990s. While the growth in
issuance of CMBS offerings has
slowed in the past few years, they
are recognized as a significant
financing vehicle comprising 15
percent of the market for debt
capital.
The increased competition,
which this new source of financing
brought to the capital markets, has
resulted in lower financing costs for
hotels, while exposing them to
changes exogenous to the hotel
property markets, as well as to
more merit-based foreclosure risks.
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